Abhisit meets with released red shirts
Bangkok Pundit: November 12, 2010
http://asiancorrespondent.com/bangkok-pundit-blog/abhisit-meets-with-released-red-shirts
|
MCOT: Two anti-government Red Shirt supporters released on bail met Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva on Thursday after serving a six-month jail term for violating the emergency decree during the extended Red Shirt protest in May. Sommai Inthanaka, 32, one of the two Red Shirt prisoners meeting the prime minister, was arrested at Lumpini Park in Bangkok on May 15 and was sentenced to a one-year imprisonment without suspension. After serving six months in jail, he was granted bail by the Justice Ministry to fight the case in the Court of Appeals and was released from Klong Prem Central Prison on Thursday. The prime minister said later he had told them that the Justice Fund, supported by the Ministry of Justice, assisted them with bail and asked them not to violate the terms of bail, so it will not be difficult to help others in similar cases next time. The Bangkok Post: Panitan Wattanayagorn, the prime minister’s deputy secretary-general, said Mr Abhisit asked them about conditions in the prison and their health. He said there are still 48 suspects in jail on the same charges who have no one to bail them out. The prime minister has asked the Justice Ministry to provide them with similar help. Matichon reports that Sommai spoke to reporters before meeting with the PM. He stated that he had been detained on May 5 after he met some red shirts friends at Lumpini Park to try to persuade them to return home. After leaving he encountered a military checkpoint near Suan Lumpini night plaza and was detained. He said he was never questioned and he was just charged with breahing the state of emergency and immediately sentenced to 1 year in jail. He stated that he was unsure why the PM had requested he visit the PM today as his older sister received a telephone call at 10 a.m and was informed that Abhisit wanted to meet him so he came. After meeting with the PM, he spoke again to reporters and said the PM asked about the conditions inside the jail and said that investigations showed that he was not involved so assistance was provided and that he would help those who are still in jail. BP: A cynic would say this is about Abhisit maintaining his poster boy image and it is a photo opportunity, but well BP sees it is at least a positive step. If Abhisit really wants to reduce the anger and bridge the divide, he needs to take actual action. Meeting with the 2 released reds shirts and to find out about the conditions inside – maybe it would have been better to ask them when they were still inside – is better than asking the Department of Corrections for some report and getting the likely response that everything is ok. Hence, it is much better to go straight to those who were inside. One of the red shirt complaints is over double standards and lack of justice. Yes, it is only after 6 months that help is coming, but it has come. Abhisit can’t change the past, but he can change the future. It is a good first step. btw, so if the Ministry bails them out and if they breach bail (and hence forfeit bail), doesn’t this just mean the Ministry of Justice has given money to itself? |
Court temporarily releases three red shirts
Prachatai: November 11, 2010
http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/2137
Three red shirts detained under the Emergency Decree have been temporarily released by the courts on bail provided by the Ministry of Justice, while two other red shirts have been denied bail, despite the Ministry’s assurances to their families.
On 9 Nov, the Southern Bangkok Criminal Court temporarily released three red shirts on bail guaranteed by the Justice Fund of the Rights and Liberty Protection Department under the Ministry of Justice.
Theeradech Sangkhathat, 44, and Sommai Inthanakha, 32, were bailed for 60,000 baht each, while Bunyarit Sodakham, 24, was bailed for 200,000 baht as he was charged with carrying a gun.
Surachai Phringphong, 19, and Krishna Thanchayapong were not released as their cases were on appeal, and the court ordered the Justice Fund to request bail from the Appeals Court.
Surachai’s parents Rabiab and Suriporn, who had come from Nakhon Ratchasima in the hope of bringing their son back home, fainted upon learning that their son was denied bail.
Later, Suriporn told reporters that she and her husband earned a living by selling boiled peanuts and yam in villages. Recently, after the floods which had submerged their house almost to the roof had receded, they were informed by Ministry of Justice officials that their son would be bailed out. They were very happy. The officials told them that Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva had approved the bail.
However, the court denied bail on the grounds that their son had carried weapons including slingshots, glass marbles, a lighter, and gasoline. Her son insisted to her that he had not had these things.
The Justice Fund promised her that it would resubmit its request for her son’s release.
The Phuea Thai Party had twice failed to get bail for him.
She said that she and her husband would return, no matter how many more times, as they pitied their son and wanted him to get out as soon as possible. They had borrowed 500 baht from their neighbour to make this trip.
Rabiab said that Surachai was his youngest son and was ordained as a novice for 8 years. Surachai had come to stay at Chaimongkhol Temple in Bangkok, and had disrobed just a few days before he was arrested.
The Social Move group recorded a conversation with the two red shirts on its blog. They said that they were beaten by soldiers and forced to confess to possessing weapons which the soldiers displayed in a pile in front of the press.
A student activist who also came to greet Surachai and Krishna upon their anticipated release said that the detainees’ family members were under a lot of stress, because officials of the Ministry of Justice had raised their expectations by telling them that the PM and Minister of Justice had been very concerned about their cases and had approved bail.
The officials also set a condition that the detainees, once released, had to stay away from politics, had to report to the authorities every 30 days for one year, and had to write letters to thank the PM, the student said, adding that the family members had consulted him on how to write these letters.
Source:
http://www.prachatai3.info/journal/2010/11/31825
What’s the point of Amnesty International in Thailand?
Andrew Spooner
Siam Voices: November 10, 2010
http://asiancorrespondent.com/siamvoices/what-s-the-point-of-amnesty-international-in-thailand
| Amnesty International’s Secretary General today paid a visit to that lovable defender of human rights, due process, democracy and accountability, Thailand’s very own PM Abhisit. At the moment, the only version of what went on at that meeting is available from a Thai government website. Doubtless, given the rumoured sources that Amnesty’s Thailand-based researcher Benjamin Zawacki uses to ascertain whether or not those imprisoned under Thailand’s draconian lese majeste laws are prisoners of conscience or not, Amnesty will likely be quick to sign up to the Thai government’s press release. Let’s hope we’re proved wrong. However, one question that must be asked, and is absolutely crucial if Amnesty International are deemed to still have any credibility left in Thailand, is did their Secretary General meet or request to meet with any UDD or Red Shirt leaders or any persons who have been or who are imprisoned since the State of Emergency was declared? I’ve put this question to Amnesty’s London press office and hope to get a response soon (but don’t count your chickens – Amnesty routinely refuse to answer any queries or criticism relating to their position on Thailand). If the Secretary General did not even attempt to meet with UDD/Red Shirt activists and leaders then serious questions must be raised about Amnesty’s lack of impartiality in Thailand. Just taking the government’s line on Thailand’s present state of affairs would be a shocking indictment of Amnesty’s perceived and widely documented failings in Thailand. What I’d like to know is did Amnesty’s Secretary General ask why Da Torpedo is still being refused medical care? When will the government end its present State of Emergency? What timetable do the government have for up and coming elections? When will the government investigate the credible allegations of torture of UDD/Red Shirt prisoners? When will the government release full details of all the political prisoners they are holding? If the Secretary General didn’t fully interrogate PM Abhisit on any of these issues one must wonder what he was actually doing in Bangkok. |
AI meets PM-Thaigov
16-11-10
| Amnesty International meets PM
ThaiGov: November 10, 2010
Mr. Salil Shetty, Secretary General of (AI) paid a call on Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva on the occasion of his visit to Thailand, at Thai Koo Fah Building, the Government House |
| The Secretary General of Amnesty Interrnational asked the Prime Minister on issues interested by the public and media, such as the political situation, situation in the southern border provinces, situation of displaced persons fleeing from fightings in Myanmar, and lèse majesté law.
The Prime Minister elaborated that the enforcement of lèse majesté law is based on basic principles and takes into account intentions of violators. It is not used to limit academic debates. Thailand is an open society, and respects and adheres to freedom of expression. This can be seen clearly from present political situation. Both the opposition and government have access to the media and newspapers, public television, and cable television – an event which is different from the past. On the decree of Public Administration in Emergency Situation, it is currently enforced only in a few provinces. In the case of Bangkok, the government has the responsibility to protect public safety. The incident at the Nonthaburi apartment building reflects that that there is also a need to monitor the situation, as there are still some movements. Personally, if feasible, I would want to cancel the decree in all provinces as soon as possible. When there is no emergency decree, I do not desire to see any chaos or another big protest. On the situation in the south, the government continues to resolve the ongoing violence and we believe that we are on the right track. However, the Prime Minister admitted that many cases have occurred before the present government came into power, and are still in the judicial process. When this government took the office, it attempts to closely monitor those cases, but we must respect the judicial process undertaken by independent agencies.
On the issue of displaced persons from Myanmar, the government has taken actions on the basis of humanitarian principles. During the latest visit to Myanmar, the Prime Minister also registered this concern with the Myanmar leaders. |
Open Letter to Salil Shetty, Secretary General, Amnesty International from a US Peace Corps volunteer in Thailand
Int’l Anti-Corruption Conference: November 11, 2010
I would like to provide the following copy of a letter just sent to AI Secretary General Salil Shetty, for your information, consideration and hopeful joint cooperation with the AI head office and the United Nations.
Thailand’s lese majeste law must be given serious study and appraisal by such institutions as AI so as to focus vital attention on the law as it exists in Thailand, as it enables abuse from the very beginning, and as it encourages the majority of Thais to opt for various prejudicial and unethical avenues to inflict punishment – generally undeserved and excessive – on those who are viewed under an archaic concensus as having defamed the country’s monarchy.
For example, it is vital that all lese majeste ‘victims’ be given legal counsel by the Thai state apparatus to fully inform them of their rights, to detail why it is that they should plead guildy. It is this important element, pressure to plead guilty, that is of utmost importance. There is a predetermination in Thailand by police, the judicial institution and society in general that speech offensive to so-called “protectors of the monarchy” is therefore offensive to the monarchy. This predetermination, linked to unexplained relevance to threats to national security, go hand-in-hand in creating a climate of fear, of hatred against those accused, and of a frightening national mania that sees enemies at every juncture in defense of the lese majeste victims’ attempt to exercise their legitimate human and civil rights.
Blood has been let many times in tegard to this horrible law, and will undoubtedly be let again. Thai authorities are guilty many times over of criminal application of unjust laws, and in particular the lese majeste provisions.
Your kind reply and hopeful willingness ot undertake a serious evaluation and issue a public statement related to Thailand’s lese majeste law, in the context of my questions raised herein and in regard to how the law actually abuses society, will be deeply appreciated.
11 November 2010
Amnesty International Secretary General Mr. Salil Shetty:
Greetings, Mr. Secretary General, from an American living in Korat, NE Thailand.
It was good to see you were able to speak with Thailand’s prime minister recently related to several subjects, including the country’s archaic and archaicly-applied lese majeste law. However, from the Thai government Ministry of Foreign Affairs release of discussion on this important topic, there was no mention whatsoever of your own inquiry details – that is, what were AI’s concerns related to this law and what were the Thai government’s responses to these other than assurances?
To quote the Thai government’s exact release of information to the media on this ‘discussion,’ quote, “The Prime Minister elaborated that the enforcement of lèse majesté law is based on basic principles and takes into account intentions of violators. It is not used to limit academic debates. Thailand is an open society, and respects and adheres to freedom of expression. This can be seen clearly from present political situation. Both the opposition and government have access to the media and newspapers, public television, and cable television – an event which is different from the past.” Unquote.
The Thai prime minister has spoken in a roundabout manner that avoids serious misuse of the lese majeste law and abuse of those who are either accused, detained, charged or imprisoned under existing criminal code provisions as they relate to this issue of lese majeste.
In fact, police currently have the legal right, sometimes even this is exceeded, to hold in remand lese majeste accused for 84 days, an automated system of 12 day each extensions. In most cases, such as that in Suvicha Thakhor’s case, he was really no danger to national security but that is the excuse Thai authorities gave when he was arrested.
Also most recently, a Thai man, as indicated from press reports, “Warawut Thanangkorn, known as Suchart Nakbangsai in cyber political forums, who was arrested for lèse majesté on 1 Nov, told Prachachat Thurakij newspaper that he would not fight his case in court, and expected to do time in jail and then seek leniency for an early release as in the cases of Suwicha Thakor and Bunyuen Prasertying.”
This gentleman, in an interview with the press, asked whether he would still do the same, if he could go back in time to 14 Oct 2008 when he delivered the speech that caused his troubles, he said that he would not. ‘I would not speak to end up in jail. Never.’
This gentleman, then, has perhaps unintentionally underscored the very nature of Thailand’s lese majeste law, that is is indeed a matter of free speech and repression thereof rather than any kind of genuine threats to national security or the monarchy as the Thai government continues to maintain.
Therefore, I kindly implore you to consider an AI/UN investigation into the nature of Thailand’s lese majeste law, how it is applied, how it is initially investigated, how a plethora of false lese majeste accusations are so easily made in Thailand…all of this especially against His Majesty the king’s own public pronouncement back in December 2005 that he wanted to be criticized, that he knew the “do not violate the king” provision was in the constitution but he wanted to be ‘violated,’ that is, analyzed and if warranted criticized.
It is hardly an international secret that Thais, and Thai authorities, are quick on the trigger, violating one human and civil right after another, in first accusing, then processing criminal lese majeste charges, against people who often have an entirely legitimate right to say what they say. That domestically Thais are so easily able to pursue public incitement and process criminal charges, often including incarceration under the pretense of safeguarding national security, is surely an abridgment of principles of human and civil rights enshrined in the UN charter and within AI’s own guidelines.
Once again, I implore you to kindly consider working with other global organizations in proceeding with an impartial yet meaningful investigation of Thailand’s misuse of the lese majeste law, a law even the country’s monarch does not agree with.
Thank you so much.
Why is a case with the ICC so frightening?
David Streckfuss
New Mandala: November 10, 2010
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/11/10/why-is-a-case-with-the-icc-so-frightening/
The Bangkok Post has distinguished itself from its English-language competitor for publishing a diversity of political views in its editorial pages. The paper’s daily editorials are often well conceived and fairly argued.
Such is not the case of its 1 November 2010 editorial which employs muddied reasoning, stoops to personal attacks, and places unwarranted faith in the justice system which has historically failed to counter impunity.
The editorial suggests that the submission of charges by the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) against the Abhisit Vejjajiva government with the International Criminal Court (ICC) is “a shocking misuse of the justice system” and that “right-thinking people” should “denounce this blot on justice.”
But is this attempt by the UDD to bring to justice the perpetrators of the April-May violence of this year as outrageous as the Bangkok Post would suggest? Is it possible for “right-thinking” people to suspect that nothing will come of the toothless, semi-independent truth and reconciliation commission set up by the government? Are there solid, historical reasons to believe that the country’s judicial system will fail to address impunity?
The editorial argues that the ICC’s “major flaw” is that it requires the court to “seriously” consider “even this wild allegation” made “by an uninvolved, third party who was on the other side of the world when the UDD rallies took place.”
Four components of this argument deserve attention.
First, it misunderstands the mission of the ICC. The editorial argues that the ICC was created to bring to justice “the most reprehensible dictators.” Actually, just regular ol’ dictators fit the ticket. The ICC states it was “established to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.” It is up to the ICC to see whether government actions in April-May of this year constitute “most serious crimes.”
The Thai government so far has seemed to show that the 91 deaths early this year were not “the most serious crimes.” Almost a half a year later, the government has yet to make public details from the autopsies of those killed. The incidents of April-May and the continued use of repressive media laws should be of “concern to the international community.”
Second, the editorial, incredibly enough, cites the examples of countries like the United States, Iran, the Philippines and China as having opposed the ICC’s broad mandate. No wonder. The United States continues to defy the international community’s concern about “enemy combatants” held at Guantanamo Bay; Iran, the Philippines, and China are all securely in the bottom 15 per cent of nations in Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index.
Third, the editorial casts aspersions against the “tasteless” Robert Amsterdam, former prime minister Thaksin Shinwatra’s lawyer and UDD legal advisor, for his “wild” and “odious effort” to harm “the country’s name and reputation.”
The presence of personal invective often signals a lack of substance and clear thinking. The charges submitted to the ICC are not a mere artifice of a political game manipulated by Thaksin and Amsterdam. The views in the UDD document reflect the suspicions and concerns of a broad swath of Thai society.
Fourth, the editorial shows dismay that a “sitting prime minister” could be accused by an “uninvolved third party” at the ICC. Actually, the editorial is quite wrong—distance is important. The problem is not that an uninvolved third party is lodging the charge, but that this entire matter should be handled by a neutral body. That is why the UDD demanded that the sitting prime minister step down so that a fair inquiry could be made. Given the Thai court’s recent record, is it completely unreasonable to wonder whether the courts can play the role of an “uninvolved third party”?
Historically speaking, UDD supporters have good reason to fear that the government’s present efforts will result in a whitewash of the April-May events. Only the massacre of May 1992 have ever been seriously investigated. The resultant 2000 report was pointless; no court has ever revoked the self-administered amnesty taken by perpetrators.
No Thai security personnel or leaders have ever been tried for the deaths of protesters in 1973, 1976, or 1992. For that matter, no official has been tried for the extrajudicial killings of as many as 3,000 persons in Thaksin’s War on Drugs.
When security forces were tried for the killing of as many as 80 Tak Bai protesters, the court last year absolved state officials of any responsibility. A Bangkok Post editorial at the time stated that such a ruling was “out of tune with democracy and public expectation. The government or security forces cannot credibly absolve themselves to avoid responsibility.”
With no examples from history, it is difficult to believe that the Thai justice system or reconciliation effort this time will magically result in a challenge to this long history of entrenched impunity.
Overall, the editorial displays utter incredulity that Thailand could be compared to a country like the Sudan, and calls the UDD efforts with the ICC a “farce.”
But it could also be argued that a sober, clear-headed view of the situation in Thailand is what is needed. The editorial states that there can be “healthy disagreement over the clashes in April and May.” But can there, when the government is working at full throttle to suppress opposing views?
If the Bangkok Post does not want Thailand to be compared with dictatorships, then it should be fighting more heartily for press freedom. The reality is that Thailand’s position has dropped to its lowest in a decade, ranking 153rd out of 178 nations (and sharing the bottom 15 per cent with the Sudan).
Hasn’t the reputation of the nation been harmed because of actions of the government, rather than by those who try to expose such actions?
Many red-shirt leaders turned themselves in so they could have their day in court to prove their innocence. Why is a case with the ICC so frightening? After all, the innocent have nothing to fear.
Dr. David Streckfuss is a writer residing in Khon Kaen.
The quantum physics of the Thai constitutional universe
Tacitus
New Mandala: November 9, 2010
Thailand has had 18 constitutions since 1932 when the absolute monarchy ended. Constitutions—the written ones—come and go as the military flexes its muscles. The question is how does a country with such a record of constitutional disintegration function? One answer is to place the written constitutions into a larger context.
An appropriate science metaphor can be drawn from our current understanding of the physics of the universe. Most scientists agree that the visible universe, that is the universe with mass and light represents something approaching 5% of the observer universe. There are an estimated 100 billion galaxies in our universe, and up to 100 billion stars in each galaxy. But this is only 5% of what is. The rest of the universe is composed of dark matter and dark energy. In physics no one has been able to figure out what is dark matter or dark energy but there are lots of competing theories.
In the context of the Thai constitutional system, the visible universe is the written constitution. Like our visible universe it is what we can see and readily understand and know. But the written constitutional universe in Thailand must be assessed against the ‘unwritten’ constitution that constitutes 95% of the actual Thai constitutional universe. Like the actual universe, the Thai constitutional universe—the part that we don’t see but no that is there—is subject to a number of theories but remains a mystery.
To continue with the physics metaphor, the lese majeste law (LM) operates like event horizon surrounding a blackhole. Getting too close to the horizon means the constitutional traveler will arrive at the event horizon the moment he begins to draw the true nature of power as divided between the written and unwritten constitution universe. That point, he/she has crossed a line and is swallowed up by the legal system that is ultimately designed to protect the unwritten constitutional system at all cost. That is the function of government—to shield the unwritten system, protect it, and make it the essence of national security. Closing down websites, jailing people for political speech, closing community radio and TV stations is less about ‘hate’ than about controlling what can be said about the relationship of Thailand two constitutional systems.
It is the unwritten constitution that assigns the power, duties and responsibilities between the military, civil servants, police, the palace and powerful families. As with dark matter, we can’t directly view what is the true relationship between these elements, how they react with one another, shift and evolve, and how the power is allocated. Or who or what group of individuals operate the levers behind the scene.
Like dark matter and dark energy, while we can’t yet see or test them directly, we know from indirect test that without them the existing visible universe would not exist. The same is true in Thailand. Without an inquiry into the unwritten constitution, it is impossible to understand how the country has managed to survive the destruction of 18 written constitutions since 1932.
Americans, Australians, Canadians and many others have a written constitution. Britain has an unwritten constitution. Thailand has a hybrid constitution, which simultaneously has a written and unwritten constitution. Once the presence of both systems is taken into account, much of Thai politics become comprehensible. The problem most outsiders (and many insiders, too) have had about Thailand is learning the coded language that indicates which constitutional system someone is talking about. Often it is like someone speaking in tongues, or switching from one language to the other without warning and explanation, or any connecting tissue of argument.
In October 2010, video leaks involving the Constitution surfaced on YouTube. The secretly filmed meetings implicate judges of the Constitutional Court in a number of scandals, from assisting their relatives to have advance questions on an examination for positions at the judges’ own Court, to the fate of the ruling party in a case involving campaign contributions. There has been no constitutional crisis. Nor will one likely emerge as the court’s function is to ensure those in charge of administering the unwritten constitutional system maintain their position. In most countries with a written constitution, these videos would have caused an immediate constitutional crisis.
The response to the video leaks by authorities (i.e., the Court, the government and the police) was to go after the whistle blower, who was a court official. He was stripped off his position and Thai passport. Online newspapers that released the leaked videos have been sued by the Court and people have been warned against disseminating the leaked videos. Thai judges and courts, by law, can’t be criticized without risking civil and criminal penalties. This immunity from criticism gives the Constitutional Court a free hand as the judges balance the interest of the written and unwritten constitutional systems and their differing but overlapping constituents.
In Thailand, people are talking, writing, blogging, tweeting about the videos and the judges but it is unlikely to lead to any substantive action by the government. This inaction is indirect evidence of the vitality and importance of the unwritten constitution and the people who shelter under it. Thailand remains a long way from the day when the elements of constitutional arrangements are contained within the written constitution. The divided constitutional house mirrors the divided public. Until that issue is resolved, it is understandable why few have come out to discuss how the current court scandal shows a flaw in the written constitution.
What is also clear is how few Thais have any allegiance to the written constitution—maybe it is because such documents are so transitory. The 1997 People’s Constitution is cited as the best of the lot. But the 1997 constitution was abrogated by the coup of September 19, 2006 and the military government wrote a new one that was more in line with the objectives of the unwritten constitution. The political turmoil and impasse that has resulted since the coup of September 19, 2006 has in large part been caused by those representing the unwritten constitutional arrangements had decided the written constitutional mandates had gone too far and a politician could use popularity along with the 1997 “People’s Constitution” as a mechanism to unwind and weaken the power base of those benefiting from the unwritten constitutional universe. The problem the military and others have had is a sudden resistance to putting the constitutional clock back, of reconfiguring the written and unwritten constitutional system in a way that looks more a constitutional universe from an earlier era.
In the last four years since the coup in Thailand, the unwritten constitution—the fall back position used by the elites for unofficial governance—has asserted itself as overriding the written constitution. In the past, no one would have thought this was unusual. The coup changed that indifference among many people. While the argument have been framed as republican or royalist, this has masked the real issue—how did the unwritten constitution permit the absolute monarchy structure to remain largely in place when the 1932 revolution replaced it with a constitutional monarchy?
The Thai ability at compromise created a constitutional world with both a written constitutional in place—the one that is shown to foreigners, students, the man in the street—and the unwritten constitution where power over force and violence is exercised as under the absolute monarchy model. With 18 constitutions since 1932, it is evident this has been an uneasy co-existence, erupting in periodic coups whenever those in the unwritten constitutional universe decide it is time to throw out those who claim legitimacy through elections.
That is the internal tension between the two constitutional systems that is largely hidden from sight. In a written constitution, legitimacy of the power and legal arrangements are said to flow from the consent of the people—and their political aspirations are said to be represented in such a power and system arrangement. To tear up the constitution has historically been done when those residing in the unwritten constitutional side feel their interest under threat. The usual reason for a coup has been allegations of corruptions by those operating under the written constitution.
Corruption has been a convenient excuse for intervention as the written and unwritten systems aren’t independent of each other, while the corruption flows under both power structures, it falls to those under the written constitution to face the consequences. Thus it is only those who serve in the written constitutional system who are vulnerable to legal consequences of wrongful actions. The unwritten constitutional officials have special power that is invulnerable to prosecution and attempts at accountability would lead to legal penalties against those pursuing such an action.
Thailand has reached a crossroads constitutionally. The tug of two separate constitutional systems, which have had an uneasy co-existence, has yet to reach a defining, decisive moment. As physicist tell us the visible universe wouldn’t exist without dark matter and dark energy. There are those in government who make the same argument in coded language about the importance of maintaining the unwritten constitutional arrangements. What has changed is the attitude of many people—it is difficult to know the exact numbers—but it seems we are not talking about a small number—who wish to incorporate a unified constitutional universe where the mystery of official and unofficial power arrangements is eliminated.
[FACT comments: Dr. Khien Theeravit is professor emeritus of Chulalongkorn University’s faculty of political science. He defended the military coup d’etat against Thaksin in 2006. A lot of people, some of whom wear red shirts, have forgotten Thaksin’s enormous human rights violations. Thaksin is proof that voting doesn’t change anything; often it makes things worse and only encourages them! Undeniably, his money still enables him to remote-control Thai politics. We hope he will increasingly be seen as just another warlord.]
Thaksin and the Poor
Prof. Dr. Khien Theeravit
November 2, 2010
Is it true that Thaksin Shinawatra was the heroic fighter for the poor? Have Thaksin?s populist projects benefited the poor? Is there any reason to believe that Thaksin’s antagonists and the so-called “Ammat” (Oligarchy) were biased against the poor? These are top issues the Thaksinists have tried to convince the people at home and abroad to say “yes”. This paper would like to try to respond to these questions.
“Populism” for Whom?
The poor and the underdog were two big target groups for the Thaksinists to build their political power. Hence, various devices were designed to incorporate them into their power base. A number of corrupt populist projects served as amazing examples of the Thaksinists? intrigues against the poor.
The healthcare program in Thailand has been humane for decades: poor patients were eligible for receiving medical treatments at the government hospitals free of charge. But no previous governments were crooked enough to claim the credit of the proceeds being done by others. The Thaksinists made it an important political campaign issue: “30 baht can cure all diseases” was hot campaign slogan for Thaksin’s party. The campaign message for this project purported to help the poor in propaganda, but in fact, the real beneficiaries have been the community leaders and the owners of small and medium enterprises, who used to pay medical bills without too much difficulty. They automatically got the right of the poor. In any case, Thaksin trickily gained popularity and votes from the poor. He certainly obtained more rewards from the non-poor sectors—canvassers, community leaders, merchants–who were not required to explain why they obtained such a right under such a capitalist system.
Other populist projects such as the village fund, the farmers’ debt moratorium, the farmers’ rehabilitation fund, and the asset revolving fund apparently looked good for the poor farmers, but in fact they harmed more than helped the poor.
The asset revolving fund, in fact allowed the poor to use the plots of land previously distributed by the government as guarantee for raising loans. That could not be done before, as plots of land were distributed to landless farmers with a legal condition that land right was granted for life but was not transferable except to legally inherited descendants. If this project could be carried out, soon poor farmers would become landless farmers again.
The one million baht village fund was essentially a vote buying scheme, and as such, it had to be executed urgently. Soon, a large number of villagers found easy access to loans and became addicted to consumerism. As a result, this scheme had accumulated bad debts approximately 150 billion baht before Abhisit Vejjajiva took over the premiership in December 2008.
The farmers’ debt moratorium and farmers’ rehabilitation funds similarly helped the poor to gain easy access to loans and encouraged debt accumulation. As a result, the poor were ‘rich’ in debts, mobile phones and their accessory expenses. Hence, the big beneficiaries were no other than Thaksin’s family members who reaped benefits at the top of such relevant lines of businesses.
In short, the Thaksinists were brilliant in exploiting the poor with all kinds of populist projects. They successfully harmed the poor by causing no pains to the victims. They ruled Thailand with despotic power for 5 years and 7 months (from February 17, 2001 to September 19, 2006), the gap between the rich and the poor was widening; the poor got poorer, and their debts were increasing rapidly, as a research report indicated as follows:[i]
Farmers’ average debt per household (baht)
2000
68,405
2001
68,279
2002
84,485
2004
104,571
2006
116,585
In contrast, in the same period, Thaksin and his family enriched themselves 100 times or more within 5 years and 7 months. Thaksin’s asset report submitted to the NACC (National Anti-Corruption Commission) when he assumed the premiership on February 17, 2001 was as follows: Thaksin’s personal asset, 569,154,868 baht (including 112,818,068 baht of investment), his wife’s asset, 9,959,597,869 baht (including 1,542,470,878 baht of investment), and his two minor daughters’ asset (Pinthongta and Paethongtarn), 4,767,045,528 baht. So, the total amount of Thaksin’s declared asset was worth 15,294,797,265 baht. (Thaksin’s elder son, Panthongtae, had reached adulthood and therefore was not required by law to be included in Thaksin’s asset declaration.)
Thaksin’s asset declaration submitted to the NACC after being ousted by the military coup on September 19, 2006 was 9,399,441,078 baht. (His wife’s included but his two daughters had by then reached adulthood.)
However, Thaksin’s asset reports have never been reliable, as already established by the verdict of the Supreme Court for the political office holders (26 February 2010). Thaksin’s asset seized by the Asset Examination Committee alone was worth 76,621 million baht, over 8 times more than the declared asset. No one has ever verified the actual amount of his asset, but most people believe the figures often quoted by the mass media that the real assets of Thaksin and his wife being hidden inside and outside the country, when his government was overthrown, were approximated to be around 90,000 – 100,000 million baht?the worth of the concealed asset exceeded that of the declared asset by about ten times.[ii]
Would the Thaksin regime and his populist policies purport to benefit the future generations of the poor, especially, the debt-ridden farmers? The answer tended to be in the negative! During his tenure as prime minister, Thaksin continued to accumulate public debt burden for the country’s next generation to bear. The public-debt figures below were compiled by the Ministry of Finance.
Thailand’s public debt (mill baht)
2001
2,934,431
2002
2,943,008
2003
2,930,041
2004
3,216,554
2005
3,235,008
If Thaksin were concerned about the destiny of the poor and their future generations, he should prove it with deeds, in line with treating his own children. His three children were granted huge amount of assets when Thaksin was in power in 2001-2006. The exact amount of their total fortune at the end of Thaksin’s despotic rule was not disclosed, but an estimate based on the three children’s shares in 23 companies was approximately 23,100 million baht.[iii] That doubled the amount they had 5 years earlier. The future of Thaksin’s own children, in comparison with other Thais, especially the poor, was moving to an opposite direction in the human security of life index.
Thaksin, a Psychopath?
Thaksin is said to have suffered from a mental illness called “psychopathy”, defined as :a personality disorder characterized by an abnormal lack of empathy combined with a strong amoral conduct, masked by an ability to appear outwardly normal.”[iv]
Robert Hare, a renowned researcher in psychopathy describes psychopaths as “intraspecies predators” who “use charisma, manipulation, intimidation, sexual intercourse, and violence to control others and to satisfy their own needs”. They lack in conscience and empathy, take what they want, and do what they please, “violating social norms and expectations without guilt and remorse.”[v]
The above description by Hare and other experts in psychopathy squarely fit well with Thaksin’s past behavior. So far, no one, even his ex-wife, has taken him to the attention of a psychiatric hospital. He should be treated as a mentally ill patient, and should be tested by Hare psychopathy checklist (20 items), and if the test is in the negative, he should be banned from politics for life, because experts in this field have agreed that so far this illness cannot be cured.
Populism in Disguise and the Damages
Populism was originally rooted in humanitarian considerations. It was the harbinger of the Russian socialist revolution in the early 20th century. The movement was led by the intellectual and the idealist city dwellers who volunteered to sacrifice their personal happiness and went to work, eat and sleep with the poor at the grassroots level, so as to improve the living conditions of the poor. The Thaksinists, on the other hand, sacrificed nothing personally to the poor. They used tax payers’ money to boastfully “help” the poor, but in fact to benefit their potential election canvassers and their own moneybags.
Thaksin’s distorted populist project, the 30 baht health care program, has effectively sabotaged the well established health care programs for employees of the state and private sectors, and created confusions to all other health care programs, old and new. The one-million baht village fund and the farmers’ debt moratorium policy have also weakened the nascent sustainable community development programs initiated locally by village wise men and women.
Basic to the distorted populist projects was to use the projects as tools for buying votes: the voters could easily “beg” for loans and cash, and often asked for more when they became addicted ? like drug addictions which are difficult to quit. The despotic regime may have known in advance that the burden to solve the problem must be borne by others.
Thaksin’s Popularity among the Poor
It is difficult to assess Thaksin’s popularity among the poor. People tend to take it for granted that the majority of the poor, especially the farmers at the grassroots level support Thaksin. In a sense the observers, especially the mass media, help reinforce Thaksin’s popularity. This is another success story of Thaksin’s image-building intrigue.
In fact, Thaksin’s popularity among the poor has not been carefully scrutinized. An academic analysis requires us to make distinction between “I love Thaksin” and “I love Thaksin’s money”. There are also people who love Thaksin without knowing him and those who side themselves with the Thaksin camp because they do not like Thaksin’s opposite camp.
In electoral politics, the money factor alone could be sufficient to discredit the myth of Thaksin’s popularity among the poor. In every election since 2001 Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai and People’s Power parties won votes/seats more than any other party, but approximately half of the votes cast were the work of Thaksin’s big moneybag: the money was distributed directly to the voters and indirectly through canvassers, community leaders, and donations in disguise to temples and social organizations. Money did not work well in city constituencies where voters were better educated politically. Other political parties neither have big moneybags at their disposal nor have the will to risk themselves to violate election law. So, if law enforcement agencies strictly enforced the law regarding limitations of each candidate?s expenditure, Thaksin’s popularity (in terms of votes and seats) might be reduced by half.
In mob politics, symbolized by the red-shirt movement, the Thaksinists were able to mobilize large rallies elsewhere in 2009-2010; the largest red-shirt rally in March-May 2010 at the peak numbered about 100,000 strong. This depended very much on big moneybags. At least, half of the participants were hired hands. The movement vanguards, security guards, and armed militants were paid handsomely: some received more than one million baht per mission. Common hired hands from the grassroots were given a minimum rate of 200 baht (US$6.7) per day, aside from food and drinks which were freely distributed.
The silent majority of the poor, the honest ones, should be reckoned with. Before Thaksin came to power in early 2001, there were various forms of rural development communities based on sustainable development philosophy. They were initiated by respectable local leaders. These self-reliant development communities were later reinforced by the King’s sufficiency economy philosophy. When threatened by Thaksin’s distorted populist policy, they had to struggle for survival. So far, they have proved themselves to be strong enough to resist Thaksin’s money power. The total number of these dignified poor is perhaps large enough to discredit the Thaksinists’ claim of gaining the support of the majority of the poor.
Conclusion
The Thaksinists have trickily built up an artificial image portraying Thaksin’s popularity among the poor. Community leaders and the rich among the poor may be considered part of the skeleton of the image. But the majority of the poor, those who love Thaksin’s money and the honest ones at the grassroots, are large enough to discredit the dishonest claim.
Thaksin possesses great skills to hide the truth. The poor, and even the general public, are not equipped with scientific techniques to detect the motive behind any of his move. The poor could not be expected to understand how Thaksin could get richer from tax payers? money out of the populist projects.
Thaksin used the state power to make himself richer: he did not hesitate to suck the blood of the poor of the present and future generations, and make them happy with rising debts.
Thaksin was brilliant in inventing smear tactics to silence his opponents. For example, he made the red-shirt movement symbolic of the poor?s cause (hiding his real intention to return to power) and tried to convince the world that the established elements and the “Ammat” (oligarchy) looked down upon the poor, so that the ruling class exercised no restraints in using force against the red shirts. Some Thaksinist protagonists have even accused the Thaksin’s opponents of committing crime against the poor by not respecting the wisdom of the poor for their right to sell votes in elections. Confronting these kinds of clever tricks to overrule the rule of law, Thaksin’s opponents have found it difficult to disclose Thaksin’s hidden ambition to the public in simple terms.
Reference
[i] See http://www.moc.moe.go.th/node/709
[ii] See http://www.stock2morror.com/forums/showthread.php?%2F=10804
[iii] See http://www.stock2morror.com/forums/showthread.php?%2F=10820
[iv] Clara Holzer in “Letters to the Editor,” The Nation, June 5, 2010, 8A. Part of the brief definition in the quotation is from http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/psychopathy
[v] http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/psychopathy
Thais read 94 minutes a day!-MCOT
16-11-10
[FACT comments: Thailand has nearly universal literacy, better than in most Western democracies. However, Thailand has not had a written culture for very long and so Thais have not until recently become accustomed to reading for pleasure. However, Bangkok’s two annual book fairs now see a million public visitors each. Presumably these statistics include all reading, including street signs and Internet. An hour-and-a-half is a near-incredible figure. They may all be reading banned books! We’d like a link to the actual research paper, or is this just govt grandstanding?]
Thais spend 94 minutes a day on average in reading: Research
MCOT: November 13, 2010
Thai people read an average of 94 minutes daily, but mainly among the young and government workers, according to academic research by Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Education and state-operated Thailand Knowledge Park (TK Park).
According to the survey, young people and government officials were those spending their time on reading the most, whereas adults aged over 49 were found spending their time on doing so the least. Persons under 20 years old were found reading less with an average of reading habits on three to four days weekly.
The research on the reading situation and reading index in 2009 released Friday was conducted in 13 provinces.
Among those surveyed, 5,865 people filled in questionnaires, 156 attended small discussion sessions, and another 191 of them were studied through their extreme reading habits — both for reading as their passion and the opposite, said Wannee Keamkate, lecturer and head of the research project.
According to the research, people living in urban areas had their reading index higher than those in suburban zones, and the reason why young people are not passionate about reading was due to their laziness.
Regarding their spending on books, Thai readers paid some Bt523 (US$18) for printed materials per month. The range of spending habits varied from spending nothing books at all until about Bt9,000 (US$310) monthly.
Meanwhile, Assoc Prof Sompong Jitradub of the Education Faculty said the fact that Thais read on average 94 minutes a day was useful information, as it could argue with previous statistics that Thais read only about eight lines a year. Such finding will as well act as a policy stimulation on reading, he added.
The Cabinet in August 2009 declared reading a national agenda by making April 2 Thailand’s ‘Reading Day’. This date also marks the birthday of HRH Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, known for being a passionate reader.
Moreover, 2009-2018 was announced as the ‘Decade of Reading’ in the country in order to promote and enhance reading habits among Thais.
[FACT comments: Oh, do we ever love it when the moral crusaders are caught by hypocrisy with their pants down and the pipe in their mouth! Makes you wonder if this clown put anybody in gaol...]
Brit Drugs Counsellor Caught Smoking Crystal Meth With Hooker
Thomas Carlin
The People: November 7, 2010
Royalty and Hollywood stars paying to escape a descent into drugs hell put their faith in Brit therapist Simon Gunn when they check into his rehab unit.
Now the former social worker faces ruin after being filmed smoking crystal meth with a hooker in a Bangkok hotel.
The video shows carefree Gunn giving the thumbs-up in cloud of smoke.
He is seen enjoying addictive crystal methamphetamine, known as ice, on a break from the clinic he set up.
Gunn, 44, had been employed in London by the Richmond Primary Care Trust and the Hounslow Drug and Alcohol Action team. He also boasts he was part of Scotland Yard’s “Amphetamine Task Force”. Then came the idea for a rehab unit like the stars’ favourite Priory but in an exotic location.
In 2005 he set up Channah in Thailand, charging clients including a big-name film director and an Asian royal up to £22,000 a month.
But all is not quite as it seems. The website carries a testimonial from “Lord Nicholas Burnett Ktgc, OBE”. There is no such peer.
And one former staff member said: “There are well meaning and professional staff but the place is run by sex-pats. They go out drinking and chasing prostitutes. This video footage is the last straw.”
Tattooed Gunn’s drugs sessions with a prostitute were videoed at Bangkok’s I Style Trend and the Citadines hotels.
The woman with Gunn is called Tae. She said: “He used to pay me 3,000 baht to buy each gram of ice. He told me he ran a place for people with drugs problems.
“I think people should know who he really is. He talks very badly about Thai people and treats women very badly.”
Now the future of Channah, 400 miles south east of Bangkok on Koh Chang, Elephant Island, is in doubt.
Gunn said: “I was caught out. I have resigned as the CEO of the clinic. I made a stupid mistake. I have been set up by a disgruntled member of the staff.”
He said of Lord Nicholas Burnett’s false title: “That’s the name on his credit card. He may have bought it, I guess.”
